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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this article is to review the concept of
freedom of speech in North Carolina prior to Gitlow v. New York.'
Gitlow, of course, held the first amendment right of freedom of
speech in the United States Constitution was applicable to the
states through the vehicle of the fourteenth amendment. Prior to 1
July 1971, neither the fundamental laws of North Carolina nor any
provision in its constitution guaranteed freedom of speech. There-
fore, to some extent the question is whether freedom of speech was
recognized by the courts of North Carolina prior to Gitlow and, if
so, how it was manifested and protected.
A brief review of the fundamental laws of North Carolina is
necessary to provide a foundation for this study. Thereafter, deci-
sional law will be examined, beginning with a discussion of post-
Gitlow cases. Reference to decisions after 1925 and prior to the 1
July 1971 constitution will be made, as well as those following the
adoption of the 1971 North Carolina Constitution. Against the
background of present day law, the paper will then trace the evolu-
tion of first amendment speech rights in North Carolina through
an examination of the decisional law prior to Gitlow. After consid-
eration of these sources, an effort will be made to arrive at some
conclusions concerning the growth of the law surrounding freedom
of speech in North Carolina.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENTS
In June, 1578, Queen Elizabeth I granted a large territory in
North America to Sir Humphrey Gilbert.2 The territory included
1. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
2. NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT 1585-1974 3 (J. Cheney, Jr. ed. 1975) (is-
sued by Thad Eure, Secretary of State) [hereinafter cited as N.C. GOVERlNMENT].
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what is now North Carolina. In 1584, Gilbert's grant was issued to
his half-brother, Sir Walter Raleigh, by letters patent. Raleigh's
letters patent contained no reference to rights of freedom of speech
for the inhabitants of the area granted. Although Raleigh's efforts
to colonize the area failed, a small but continuous stream of set-
tlers moved into the area south of the present Virginia-North Car-
olina boundary line. The area is known as the Albemarle region. As
a result of this development, Charles II granted the area to eight
lords proprietors in 1663 and 1665.'
The charters of 1663 and 1665 do not directly grant a right of
freedom of speech to inhabitants of the territory. They contain,
however, provisions that the inhabitants of the area
shall be Denizens and lieges of us... and be in all things held,
treated, and reputed as the liege, faithful people of us. . . and
may inherit . . . all liberties, Franchises, and Privileges of this
our Kingdom of England... may freely ahd quietly have, pos-
sess, and enjoy as our liege people ... without the let, molesta-
tion ... or grievance of us, our heirs and Successors; any Statute
... to the contrary not-withstanding.4
This provision will prove important in considering the concept of
freedom of speech as a part of the rights of Englishmen, and as a
part of the common law of North Carolina.
On 21 July 1669, the lords proprietors proclaimed the Funda-
mental Constitutions for the government of Carolina. 5 The propri-
etors and their agents of government in the colony continued their
control through the vehicle of this document. It effectively elimi-
nated participation by the people in the exercise of the govern-
ment, but provided certain safeguards for the benefit of the people.
These protections were: a prohibition against double jeopardy,
A copy of this grant was not discovered by this research.
3. J. LocKE, A COLLECTION Or SEVERAL PIECES OF MR. JOHN LOCKE 1-53
(London 1720).
4. N.C. GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, at 102-03. This provision was evidently
included in an effort to encourage migration into the area. Other provisions in the
charter, and in the Concessions and Agreement between the Lords Proprietors
and Major William Yeamans and Others in 1665, gave the people certain partici-
pation in the government of the area, particularly with respect to the legislative
process. These rights were effectively eliminated in the Fundamental Constitu-
tions of 1669, discussed infra.
5. See J. LOCKE, supra note 3. It is claimed, although not without dispute,
that the 1669 constitution was written by John Locke upon the request of the
Earl of Shaftsbury, one of the proprietors.
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right to trial by jury of twelve and a majority verdict, right of free-
holders to vote for representation in the parliament, and freedom
of religion.6 The constitution, however, included neither a guaranty
of nor reference to freedom of speech. To "avoid erecting a numer-
ous Democracy" is one of the stated purposes of the constitution.
As it is understood in the western world, freedom of speech is an
integral basis of democracy. Thus, one may speculate that perhaps
the lords proprietors deliberately failed to include such provision
in the constitution. At any rate, the right of free speech did not
exist in documented form at this time in the Carolina colony.
This early constitution was never fully implemented. It was
suspended in the 1690's, at which time the Assembly regained its
former power of initiating legislation. In 1729, the lords proprietors
(except Carteret, the Earl of Granville) sold and conveyed their
interests in the grant to the Crown. From 1729 until the Revolu-
tion of 1776, Carolina was a Crown Colony.8 Needless to say, free-
dom of speech was not recognized by the government during this
period.
The Halifax Resolves of 12 April 1776,9 which authorized dele-
gates from the colony of North Carolina to concur with other dele-
gates in declaring the independence of the colonies, made no refer-
ence to freedom of speech.-Nor was reference made in the Halifax
Declaration of Rights of 17 December 1776.10 On 18 December
1776, the Fifth Provincial Congress promulgated the constitution,
including the Declaration of Rights which contained a provision
that "freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty,
and therefore ought never to be restrained." '11 The documents be-
came effective upon promulgation by the Congress and were not
submitted for adoption by a vote of the people.12
Although the constitution of 1776, contained a provision guar-
6. Of interest to lawyers is the provision that "it shall be a base and vile
thing to Plead for money or Reward" (in court) and counsel could not represent
another in court, except a close kinsman, without taking an oath before the judge
that he did not plead the cause for money or reward. How times have changed!
7. J. LOCKE, supra note 3, at 2.
8. Id.
9. N.C. GovRNmENT, supra note 2, at 405.
10. Id. at 809-811.
11. N.C. CONST. art. I, Declaration of Rights § 15 (1776).
12. 11-2 F. NASH, THE NORTH CAROLINA CONsTrruTION OF 1776 AND ITS MAK-
ans 17-19 (1912). (This work is part of the James Sprunt Studies in History and
Political Science).
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anteeing freedom of the press, it contained no reference to freedom
of speech.' 3 Three other states of the thirteen original states,
Rhode Island, Delaware, and New Jersey, did not have a guaranty
of freedom of speech in their original constitutions." Section 21 of
the Declaration of Rights, however, provides "that a frequent re-
course to fundamental principles is absolutely necessary to pre-
serve the blessings of liberty."15 The logical question is whether
freedom of speech was considered such a "fundamental principle"
that the drafters saw no need, in view of Section 21, to expressly
state it in the constitution. The Declaration of Rights was incorpo-
rated as a part of the constitution."
It is important to note that in federal decisions, freedom of
speech and freedom of press have seldom been sharply differenti-
ated. This may result from the fact that both rights are protected
by one clause of the first amendment. The North Carolina Consti-
tution had no guaranty of freedom of speech until 1971,17 and as
we shall see, the Supreme Court of North Carolina analyzed and
decided speech cases and press cases differently.
The Legislature had ample opportunity to include a freedom
of speech article. In 1835, substantial amendments to the constitu-
tion were made without reference to freedom of speech.' By act of
the General Assembly, the Convention of 1861-62 was called, and
by resolution adopted the Ordinance of Secession, taking the state
out of the Union. The convention ratified the Constitution of the
Confederate States of America and further amended the state con-
stitution 9 without reference to freedom of speech.
In April of 1868, the people ratified a new constitution drafted
by the Convention of 1868.0 The convention had been called upon
the initiative of Congress, but with a popular vote of approval."
13. N.C. CONST. of 1776.
14. See DEL. CoNsT. of 1776, N.J. CONST. of 1776, and R.I. CONsT. of 1845.
15. 23 W. CLARK, THz STATE R CORDS O NoRTH CAROLINA, 1715-1776,977-84
(1904), contains the text of the constitution and Declaration of Rights.
16. Id.
17. N.C. CONST. art. I, Declaration of Rights § 14 (1776).
18. N.C. GovERMENT, supra note 2, at 817-23.
19. The Constitution of the Confederate States of America contained a guar-
anty of freedom of speech. N.C. GovERNET, supra note 2, at 407-19. The people
of North Carolina did not have an opportunity to ratify or disaffirm the work of
the Convention of 1861-62. By terms of the legislative act, the convention had
authority to promulgate its resolutions without a vote of the people.
20. Id. at 796.
21. Id. An earlier revised constitution had been defeated by a vote of the
19821 247
5
Martin: Freedom of Speech in North Carolina Prior to Gitlow v. New York,
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1982
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
This constitution remained in effect for one hundred and three
years, with amendments from time to time. The 1776 Declaration
of Rights was incorporated into the 1868 document as its article I,
still without any reference to freedom of speech, but with the origi-
nal protection of freedom of the press continued."'
Finally, after a fifteen-year effort, the Constitution of 1971 was
adopted by vote of the people. During this interim period, the 1963
session of the Legislature adopted the infamous "speaker ban
law."'28 We shall return to this statute later in considering what
effect, if any, it had upon the adoption of the freedom of speech
provision in the 1971 Constitution. Meanwhile, for the first time in
the history of the state, its Constitution contained a guaranty of
freedom of speech, providing: "Freedom of Speech and Press.
Freedom of speech and of the press are two of the great bulwarks
of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained, but every person
shall be held responsible for their abuse." ' This provision of the
North Carolina Constitution remains unchanged today.
III. THE COMMON LAW
Freedom of speech is a fundamental doctrine and is indispen-
sable to the continued growth and well-being of our free society.26
It has been cherished in North Carolina "since long before the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution."2 6 This assertion by Justice Lake of the Supreme Court
of North Carolina reinforces the fact that freedom of speech was a
common law right in North Carolina before it was established as a
documented right in 1971.
The common law embraces that great body of unwritten law
founded upon general custom, usage or common consent, and
based upon natural justice or reason. It is the system of rules and
declarations of principles from which our judicial ideas and legal
definitions are derived. "It is manifest that the laws of England are
the laws of this Government, so far as they are compatible with our
people in August, 1866, although the people approved resolutions of the Conven-
tion of 1886 nullifying secession and abolishing slavery.
22. Id.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-199 (1963) (amended 1965).
24. N.C. CONsT. art. I, Declaration of Rights § 14 (1971).
25. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
26. State v. Williams, 272 N.C. 147, 157; 158 S.E.2d 37, 45 (1967).
[Vol. 4:243
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way of living and trade.' 7
The Constitution does not create the right of freedom of
speech, but merely guarantees that an existing right may remain
unimpaired. Thus, we must look to the development and the scope
of freedom of speech in North Carolina in 1776.
Freedom of speech during the years preceding the Revolution
was a restricted freedom. Free speech was denied papists and reli-
gious heretics.' s Freedom of speech was in England and, by exten-
sion, in North Carolina, "little else than the right to write or say
anything which a jury, consisting of twelve shopkeepers, think it
expedient should be said or written."'2 One could say what he
pleased if he was willing to assume the risk of the consequences.
This is consistent with the views expressed by the United States
Supreme Court. In Robertson v. Baldwin,8 the Court stated that
the Bill of Rights did not set forth any novel principles of govern-
ment, but only guaranteed the rights we had inherited from Eng-
land. These rights had always been subject to well-recognized ex-
ceptions, and these exceptions continued to be recognized. For
example, the Court stated that free speech did not allow publica-
tion of libelous, blasphemous, or indecent articles or other publica-
tions injurious to public morals or private reputation.8 1
It appears that freedom of speech was not one of the funda-
mental rights of Englishmen.8 These rights are declared in the
Magna Carta," obtained from King John in 1215, the Petition of
Right,3' the Habeas Corpus Act" passed under Charles II, the Bill
of Rights" enacted in parliament, and the Act of Settlement."
These rights were viewed by Blackstone as natural rights, and con-
sisted of three primary articles: the right of personal security in
one's life, limbs, body, health and reputation; the personal liberty
27. N.C. Laws 1715, Ch. 31, § 5.
28. A. Dicz,, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
240 (8th ed. 1920).
29. Id. at 242.
30. 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
31. Id.
32. A. Dicm, supra note 28, at 236.
33. Magna Carta (1215). For a general discussion of the Magna Carta, see W.
McKCHNIZ, MAGNA CARTA (1905); I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 171-173 (1895).
34. I W. BLACKSTONz, CoMMENTARIES *128 (1783).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
1982] 249
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of persons to locomotion and freedom from imprisonment, unless
by due course of law; and the right to the free use, enjoyment and
disposal of all property, without control, except by the law of the
land. 6 English judges and officials have long spoken of freedom of
speech as the "palladium of the constitution," but such is not the
case.39 We find no mention of such right in the Petition of Right or
the Bill of Rights,'0 two of the great constitutional documents pro-
viding the fountainhead for our federal Bill of Rights and the Dec-
laration of Rights of 1776 in North Carolina. The press was re-
stricted by license in England until 1694, and seditious libel and
blasphemy were severely punished by the courts long after that
date."1
The colonists brought freedom of speech to America with the
restrictions as they existed in England at the time. The limitations
on freedom of expression were used to prevent the common people
from involving themselves with the affairs of government prior to
the Revolution. As late as 1671, we find Governor Berkeley of Vir-
ginia thanking God that there were no free schools or printing."'
Although absent an express reference to freedom of speech,
the North Carolina Declaration of Rights was probably second only
to George Mason's Bill of Rights for Virginia in declaring a free-
dom of the press. North Carolina was a leader in refusing to accept
a form of government without a documented statement of individ-
ual rights. It was not until 22 December 1789, after Congress had
proposed the Bill of Rights, that North Carolina ratified the
United States Constitution.4
It thus appears that at the time of the Revolution freedom of
speech was a part of the common law of North Carolina. The free-
dom was not an absolute one, however, but subject to the controls
and vagaries that existed under the common law of the time. This
was the view stated by Blackstone some twenty years prior to the
adoption of our federal constitution." The provisions of the char-
ters of 1663 and 1665"4 manifest the intention of the crown that
38. Id. at *127-41.
39. See I W. BLACKSTONE, CoMmzNTAR=S App. G, at 11-14 (Tucker rev.
1803).
40. I W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *128.
41. IV W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *151-52.
42. A. HOwARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrtiON oF VIRGINIA 250 (1974).
43. U.S. CoNST. (Library of Congress ed. XLI n. 14, 1972)..
44. IV W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 41, at *151-53.
45. See supra text accompanying note 3.
250 [Vol. 4:243
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the colonists could enjoy the rights that existed under the common
law of England. The right was never guaranteed by the fundamen-
tal documents of the state until the Constitution of 1971; nor did
the Legislature seek to protect or safeguard freedom of speech by
legislative enactment."
IV. THE DECISIONAL LAW
A. Post-1925
We now turn to examine some of the decisional law to deter-
mine how the courts resolved questions which today would appear
to involve freedom of speech. In so doing, a brief review of deci-
sions after 1925 will be instructive in our study of the pre-Gitlow
cases. Gitlow had little immediate effect upon the state court deci-
sions in North Carolina; there was no explosion of first amendment
cases. There was no perceptible change in the number of such
cases until after World War II. In deciding post-Gitlow first
amendment issues, however, the court recognized and analyzed
them as such, contrary to what we shall see was the practice prior
to Gitlow.
The following are illustrative decisions in the post-Gitlow era.
In Allen v. Southern Railway Co. 47 the court analyzed the question
of whether mandatory collection of union dues, a portion of the
dues being used for political purposes, violated the first amend-
ment rights of workers, and held that it did not."
State v. Cole,4" a 1959 case involving strife between Lumbee
Indians and the Ku Klux Klan, resulted in prosecution of Klan
members for inciting a riot. The court rejected defendants' argu-
ment that their assembly was constitutionally protected, stating
that the right of free assemblage does not sanction assembly by a
secret society for the unlawful purpose of intimidating or coercing
the populace.5
State v. Avent, 51 decided in 1961, was one of the first "sit in"
46. The Assembly did adopt an act granting freedom of speech to members
of the General Assembly in session and protecting them from liability therefor.
This statute was passed in 1787 and remains, unamended, the law today. N.C.
GmN. STAT. § 120-9 (1981).
47. 249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125 (1959).
48. Id. at 505, 107 S.E.2d at 134.
49. 249 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.2d 732 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 867 (1959).
50. Id. at 741, 107 S.E.2d at 739.
51. 253 N.C. 580, 118 S.E.2d 47 (1961), vacated, 373 U.S. 375 (1963), rev'd,
2511982]
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cases in North Carolina. In disposing of defendants' claim that
they were exercising free speech by advocating the termination of
racial discrimination, the court held they could not trespass on pri-
vate property for first amendment purposes. 52 Freedom of speech
could not be exercised as a part of a trespass. This reasoning is
analogous to the holding in the 1874 case of State v.
Widenhouse," in which the court, without addressing the free
speech issue, held defendant was trespassing while riding up and
down the public highway cursing and singing, upon the theory that
the prosecuting witness owned the land underlying the highway.
In 1967, the court in State v. Wiggins" relied upon the 1878
decision in State v. Ramsay" in upholding a statute preventing
interruption or disturbance of any school. In so doing, the court
held that reasonable restraints in time and place upon freedom of
speech were constitutional." The court also stated that freedom of
speech had been cherished in North Carolina long before adoption
of the fourteenth amendment. 7 The later actions of the courts in
North Carolina fail to sustain this statement.
Beginning with the 1971 decision in State v. Leigh," the court
commenced to rely principally upon United States Supreme Court
decisions in treating freedom of speech issues. Leigh was decided
after the effective date of the freedom of speech amendment to the
North Carolina Constitution in 1971. Here, the court held that
freedom of speech principles did not apply to allow defendant to
interfere with an officer in the arrest of another person.5'
Applying federal cases, the court in State v. Summrell," held
unconstitutional a statute proscribing the use of coarse or abusive
language so as to alarm another. And in State v. Felmet,61 the
court held that defendant's accosting customers in the private
parking lot of a privately owned and operated shopping mall was
262 N.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d 161 (1964).
52. Id. at 593, 118 S.E.2d at 56.
53. 272 N.C. 147, 158 S.E.2d 37 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
54. 272 N.C. 147, 158 S.E.2d 37 (1967).
55. 78 N.C. 448 (1878). In Ramsay the court found defendant subject to
criminal penalties for disturbing a church service. He spoke out concerning his
earlier expulsion from the congregation, an issue foreign to the service.
56. 272 N.C. at 158, 158 S.E.2d at 45.
57. Id. at 157, 158 S.E.2d at 45.
58. 278 N.C. 243, 179 S.E.2d 708 (1971).
59. Id. at 251, 179 S.E.2d at 713.
60. 282 N.C. 157, 192 S.E.2d 569 (1972).
61. 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708 (1981).
252 [Vol. 4:243
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not protected as an exercise of freedom of speech. The court recog-
nized that under the doctrine of Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 2 the state could interpret its freedom of speech provision.
to protect such speech, but refused to do so.6"
During the 1970's and 1980's, the court relied upon federal
court decisions in upholding cases involving statutes and ordi-
nances restricting: obscenity," parade permits,6 outdoor moving
picture screen locations," nighttime activities (curfews), 7 loud
speakers," signs,69 and, in GASP v. Mecklenburg County,70 smok-
ing in public buildings was held not to violate first amendment
rights. Our court has held that the application of a public nuisance
statute to the business of prostitution does not violate rights of
freedom of association as guaranteed by the first amendment.7 1
The court here returned to the nineteenth century method of a
nuisance doctrine to control the actions and behavior of people.
During this same time period, cases involving freedom of
speech increased in the federal courts, a popular forum for insti-
tuting first amendment cases. Since 1965, approximately fifty-two
cases are reported in the federal courts of North Carolina involving
freedom of speech issues, compared to twenty-three reported in
the appellate reports of the state courts.7 ' These figures may be
somewhat misleading since most of the federal cases found are trial
court decisions of the district courts, whereas the trial court deci-
sions of the state courts are not reported in North Carolina. With
this background, we turn to a review of the pre-Gitlow decisions.
62. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
63. 302 N.C. at 178, 273 S.E.2d at 712.
64. State v. Bryant and State v. Floyd, 285 N.C. 27, 203 S.E.2d 27 (1974).
65. State v. Frinks, 284 N.C. 472, 201 S.E.2d 858 (1974).
66. Variety Theatres v. Cleveland County, 282 N.C. 272, 192 S.E.2d 290
(1972).
67. State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 178 S.E.2d 449 (1971).
68. State v. Smedberg, 31 N.C. App. 585, 229 S.E.2d 841 (1976).
69. Cumberland County v. Eastern Federal Corp., 48 N.C. App. 518, 269
S.E.2d 672 (1980).
70. 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979).
71. Gilchrist v. Hurley, 48 N.C. App. 433, 269 S.E.2d 646 (1980).
72. Tabulations are based on the author's personal research and are accurate
as of the date of publication.
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B. 1778-1925
1. Federal Cases
Before reviewing the state cases, a brief look at the decisions
of the federal courts concerning free speech during this era pro-
vides us with additional background on the status of freedom of
speech during the early development of this country. Prior to
World War I and the legislation on espionage, very few federal
cases addressed freedom of speech rights. Late in the nineteenth
century, there began some judicial activity; but, prior to the Civil
War, few speech cases are found. There was no statutory frame-
work to provide a basis for free speech, except the Sedition Act of
1798. Moreover, after 1812, the federal courts had no jurisdiction
over common law crimes. In some of the early reports we find deci-
sions of the federal circuit court for the district of North Carolina
printed. One such was the 1826 libel suit of Whitaker v. Free-
man,73 with the trial judge being none other than Chief Justice
John Marshall. Plaintiff, a Congregational minister, claimed defen-
dant defamed him by a letter stating that he was in the habit of
whipping his wife. The Chief Justice wrote for eighteen pages, dis-
coursing on a variance between the declaration and the proof,
without any mention of freedom of speech principles. "
Pre-World War I litigants espousing freedom of speech rights
under the federal constitution found little success. The decisions
indicate that the federal courts were wary of, it not hostile to, free-
dom of speech claims. Evidently, until the first world war, the
United States was dedicated to the industrialization of its econ-
omy, not to protecting the undeveloped rights of individuals.5
The cases are replete with examples of the United States
courts' failure to discuss free speech principles." The federal
courts did little to recognize or advance freedom of speech during
73. 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 271 (1826).
74. Id.
75. P. MuRPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDom OF SPEECH: Fmsr AMENDMNrr
FREEDOMS FROM WU.SON TO FDR (1972).
76. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (contempt of court by editor);
Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904) (restricting use of mails);
Davis v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897) (ordinance requir-
ing permit to speak on public ground, Boston Common); Robertson v. Baldwin,
165 U.S. 275 (1897) (freedom of speech as common law); Rosen v. United States,
161 U.S. 29 (1896) (obscene paper); Speis v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887)
(Haymarket riot).
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this era, and, as will be noted in the discussion of North Carolina
decisional law, our state Supreme Court was similarly disposed.
2. Federal-State Relations
The status of federal-state relations during the pre-Gitlow pe-
riod is quite interesting. For the first fifty years of the republic, the
United States Supreme Court reviewed very few state decisions.
There appeared to be little tension between the two systems. Two
cases, however, indicate how the state court regarded the United
States Constitution during this period.
In the 1844 decision in State v. Newsom,7 7 the state court con-
strued a statute making it illegal for any free person of color to
wear, carry on his person, or keep in his house a firearm, sword,
dagger or bowie-knife without a license from the court of pleas and
quarter sessions of the county. It was argued that the statute was
unconstitutional, being in violation of the second amendment to
the United States Constitution, the right of the people to keep and
bear arms, and articles 3 and 17 of the Declaration of Rights of the
North Carolina Constitution of 1776.7' Article 3 proscribed exclu-
sive emoluments or privileges to any set of men, and article 17
guaranteed the right of the people to bear arms.79
The court correctly stated the law of that time; the United
States Constitution and the limitations of power contained in it
applied only to the federal government and not to the several
states. The second amendment made no reference to the states and
was held to restrict only the powers of the federal government.
With respect to article 3, the court held that the statute did not
violate the article, under the hazy and uneasy theory that if it were
void, then all legislation on the subject of free negoes was void. 0
Other constitutional challenges upon legislation on free negroes
had been denied, and this long acquiescence, reasoned the court,
supported the interpretation that article 3 was not violated by the
statute. The court, in the essence, held that free negroes were a
constitutional class for equal protection purposes. In discussing ar-
ticle 17, the court held that the statute did not prohibit the defen-
dant from carrying arms in defense of the state, but only pre-
vented the indiscriminate use of weapons on ordinary occasions by
77. 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250 (1844).
78. Id. at 251-54.
79. Id. at 251-53.
80. Id. at 252.
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free persons of color.8 In arriving at this conclusion, the court con-
veniently omitted the comma in the official text of the article be-
tween the words "arms" and "for, ' 8 1 thus, supporting its interpre-
tation that the article only assured the people's right to bear arms
for the defense of the state. The court very plainly stated that
"free people of color cannot be considered as citizens in the largest
sense of the term."8
The second case indicating how the state courts regarded the
United States Constitution during this period was decided in 1904,
some twenty-one years before Gitlow. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina adhered to the principle that the first ten amend-
ments restrict only the federal government and are not applicable
to the states." The court quoted and cited United States Supreme
Court decisions in support of this principle. Here, the question in-
volved contempt proceedings for failure of respondent Briggs to
answer questions concerning his participation in gambling. A stat-
ute required such answers and also provided complete immunity
from prosecution by reason of the information so elicited. Briggs
argued that the statute was in violation of both federal and state
constitutions."8
After holding that the federal constitution was not applicable,
the court considered the challenge under the state constitution.
The court found that the granting of absolute immunity in the
statute itself avoided any constitutional defects, and the court sus-
tained the contempt citation. 6 In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied upon decisions by the United States Supreme Court
interpreting the fifth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. One of the United States Supreme Court cases, Counselman
v. Hitchcock,87 in turn relied upon the North Carolina case of La-
Fontaine v. Southern Underwriters," completing the citation cir-
cle. Some insight into the Court's reasoning at that time is found
in the following quotations from the concurring opinion of Justice
Douglas:
81. Id. at 254.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. In re Briggs, 135 N.C. 118, 47 S.E. 403 (1904).
85. Id. at 120-21, 47 S.E. at 403-404.
86. Id. at 121-22, 47 S.E. at 404.
87. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
88. 83 N.C. 132 (1880).
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I am not partial to maxims which tend to abridge the liberty of
the citizen or to deprive him of the equal protection of the law.
... The individual has inherent rights as well as the court,
and it was primarily for the protection of those rights that courts
themselves were instituted. The old idea that the individual is a
mere atom of the State, having no rights except those that have
been granted to him by the sovereign, has no application in this
country. Here the state is the creature of the citizen, who holds
his personal rights inherently and inalienably.8
I believe there is something dearer to the human heart than the
mere money involved in a fine, something more terrible even than
going to jail. To compel a man to reveal the innermost secrets of
his life that would destroy his reputation, render him infamous in
the eyes of his fellow-men, or tend to break up a happy home,
might inflict suffering upon the innocent as well as the guilty
equal to any punishment known to the law. Tears shed by a faith-
ful wife over a dishonored bed are bitterer than those over an
honored grave.'0
I must confess some hesitation in conceding that the doctrine
of statutory substitution can ever apply to constitutional guaran-
tees, and I am induced to do so in this case only upon controlling
principles of public policy, and upon assurance that absolute im-
munity is guaranteed to the witness. 1
Thus, we see the 1904 Court expressing the concept that individual
rights may indeed be paramount to the interests of the state.
3. North Carolina
The following review of North Carolina decisional law indi-
cates that until 1925 the state courts basically ignored freedom of
speech principles in deciding issues that today would require an
analysis of such principles, primarily due to the failure of counsel
in briefing and arguing freedom of speech issues to the court.
Wherever the issue may have arisen, the court used several devices
to determine freedom of speech issues without actually discussing
them. These included: technical defects in criminal indictments;
lack of evidence to constitute a criminal offense; deference to the
"authority" of municipalities to make rules for the preservation of
89. 135 N.C. at 126-27, 47 S.E. at 405 (Douglas, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 136, 47 S.E. at 408 (Douglas, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 138, 47 S.E. at 409 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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order; refusal to extend all rights to slaves and free blacks; and
simple refusal to recognize freedom of speech questions. Research
does not disclose a single case prior to 1925 where the result of the
trial court was reversed or overturned because of a violation of
freedom of speech rights. It is clear that the courts were mainly
concerned with protecting and stimulating the economy, protecting
property rights vis-a-vis personal liberties, maintaining quiet and
good order in communities, preserving the status of the slave prior
to 1865, and securing economic and political control in the white
race.
The earliest North Carolina cases are reported by the Court of
Conference, the forerunner of the Supreme Court, for although the
constitution of 1776 contained a provision for the establishment of
a supreme court, it was not until November, 1818, that one was
established by the Legislature. Prior to that time, the Court of
Conference, made up of a quorum of at least two of the six supe-
rior court (trial) judges, performed the function of appellate
review."
From this era the decisional law in North Carolina respecting
first amendment rights can be roughly divided into several groups.
These are: individual rights of speech and conduct, rights of as-
sembly, and freedom of the press.
a. Speech
(1) Slander. The earliest cases providing an opportunity for
the court to consider the individual rights of speech involved alle-
gations of slander, but the court established early the practice of
failing to recognize or discuss the speech issue in such cases. In so
doing, the court's decisions were consistent with those of the
United States Supreme Court, which also refused to recognize a
first amendment right in defamation cases until the 1960's. Two
representative decisions follow.
The first case in which the court had the opportunity to apply
first amendment principles in North Carolina was the 1794 deci-
sion in Hamilton v. Dent.93 Plaintiff had accused defendant of
swearing "false in two particulars in one oath in court." The jury
returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of sixty
92. Clark, C.J., History of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 177 N.C.
616 (1919).
93. 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 116 (1794).
94. Id. at 116-17.
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pounds. Upon appeal, the court was concerned only with the ques-
tion of whether the words so spoken must impute a crime on the
part of the plaintiff in order to state a cause of action. Counsel
made no argument based on freedom of speech, nor was it men-
tioned by the court, but, the court did set forth an example of
what it considered to be slanderous words. The example did not
involve the imputation of a crime; the defendant was accused of
saying to a young lady, "you went to such a place to drop your
stink."'96 An action based upon this example today would immedi-
ately invoke the defenses of freedom of speech.
In McGuire v. Blair," we find the court avoiding freedom of
speech issues by the simple expedient of declaring that the words
spoken were not slanderous. In so doing, it was obvious that the
court was not cognizant of the application of first amendment
principles to the language used by the defendant. The language
alleged was, "He [meaning the plaintiff], one of our little Chowan
justices of the peace, was taken up a few nights ago playing cards
with negro Quomana, in a rookery box, and committed to jail, and
remained there until next day 9 or 10 o'clock, and then was turned
out and split for the country."' 7 Again, such language today would
certainly be defended by first amendment principles.
(2) Profane Swearing. When faced with the problems of pro-
tecting the peace and tranquility of the state from disruption, the
court first utilized the doctrine of common law nuisance. At this
early stage of the development of the law in North Carolina, there
were no statutory laws or ordinances proscribing profane swearing
or other disruptive conduct. Nor had the statutory law of nuisance
been developed. It was therefore natural and necessary to use the
cumbersome device of common law nuisance to control such activi-
ties. Thus, we find a line of cases in which the court utilized the
law of nuisance for the purposes of controlling speech in appropri-
ate situations.
The court was first concerned with profane swearing in State
v. Kirby." Defendant swore several oaths in the courtyard during
the sitting of the court. The court held that profane swearing, of
itself, was not an indictable offense. But, if it caused a nuisance by
great disturbance to citizens necessarily present, it was indicta-
95. Id. at 120.
96. 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 328 (1816).
97. Id. at 328.
98. 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 254 (1809).
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ble." No reason was given for the holding that the swearing in and
of itself was not indictable. While limiting itself to the framework
of a nuisance theory, the court inadvertently protected defendant's
individual rights of speech, a result consistent with our present in-
terpretation of the first amendment.
In State v. Ellar,100 defendant was indicted for being an evilly
disposed person who "did, in the public street of Jefferson, pro-
fanely curse and swear and take the name of God in vain, to the
evil example, etc., and to the common nuisance of the good citizens
of the State."1 1 The court held that drunkenness and profane
swearing could be similarly analyzed, and that although a single
act of either was not indictable, repeated public acts as to "become
an annoyance and inconvenience to the citizens at large" are in-
dictable as common nuisances. "A common scold is indictable as a
common nuisance . . . a common profane swearer may be so
considered."1 2
The court appeared to be analyzing the question on the basis
of whether the act was significant enough to support action by the
state to punish it. Individual rights of the defendant were not con-
sidered, the question being whether there was an oppressive use of
power by the state in punishing the defendant.10 3 As illustrated in
the case following, however, some judges used more traditional
personal liberties reasoning.
The court continued its analysis of nuisance in State v. Bald-
win.1°4 Seventeen defendants were charged with gathering at a
meeting house and, by loud and profane swearing, cursing and
quarreling, allegedly disturbed a singing school then in session. In
considering the validity of the indictment, the court held that to
be a nuisance such action must be so inconvenient and trouble-
some as to annoy the whole community, and not merely particular
persons; that is, there must be sufficient facts to support an allega-
tion of annoyance to the community. 0 5
Here, the court held there was only one act of profane swear-
ing and cursing, disturbing those present. There was no annoyance
to the citizens in general, and no single act of profanity was indict-
99. Id.
100. 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 267 (1827).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 268.
103. Id.
104. 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 195 (1835).
105. Id. at 197.
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able.106 Without using the phrase freedom of speech, Justice Gas-
ton relied upon constitutional doctrines when he wrote:
If we sustain this as an indictment for a common nuisance, we
shall be obliged to hold, that whenever two or more persons talk
loud or curse or quarrel in the presence of others, it may be
charged that this was done to the common nuisance, and if so
found, will warrant punishment as for a crime. This would be ei-
ther to extend the doctrine of common nuisances, far beyond the
limits within which they have hitherto been confined, or to allow
a vagueness and generality in criminal charges, inconsistent with
that precision and certainty on the records so essential as re-
straints on capricious power, and so salutary as the safeguards of
innocent men. 0 7
The North Carolina court once again reviewed the law of nui-
sance with respect to profane swearing in State v. Jones.'"8 Here,
the court seized upon a technical defect in the indictment to side-
step the guilty verdict, although there was ample evidence to con-
vict the defendant. The court held that it was necessary for the
indictment to allege that the swearing was repeated, public and in
the presence of people. Although the evidence in Jones clearly sup-
ported all these elements, it could not cure the defect in the
pleading.' 9
The court continued to use the device of the defective plead-
ing in determining similar cases. It could be inferred from these
cases that the court tacitly recognized the inherent right of an in-
dividual to speak his mind and was restricting the use of nuisance
in the control of speech. Remembering the almost mechanistic ap-
proach of courts in the nineteenth century to the technicalities of
pleadings, however, it is perhaps more reasonable to view the cases
as simply instances in which the court adopted a formal, technical
approach to the pleadings. This is corroborated in that the court
also adopted this procedure in cases not involving personal free-
dom questions.
For example, in State v. Wright,"0 in the indictment for keep-
ing a disorderly house, it was alleged that defendant allowed his
five sons and "evil disposed persons, as well men as women, and as
106. Id. at 198.
107. Id. at 199.
108. 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 38 (1848).
109. Id.
110. 51 N.C. 25 (1858).
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well free persons as slaves,"' to come together at all hours of day
and night, creating loud noises and cursing to the common nui-
sance of all good citizens of the state. On appeal, the court held the
evidence did not establish a criminal offense. The court noted that
although the neighborhood was thickly settled," 2 defendant lived
in the county and not in or near a public road. The good people of
the state were not annoyed or inconvenienced by defendant's ac-
tions. Only two families were so disturbed. Because the action did
not constitute a common nuisance, as distinguished from a private
nuisance, it was not indictable."3
In State v. Pepper,"14 the court again used a technical defect
in the bill to defeat the State's case and avoid any discussion of
first amendment principles. Relying upon the precedent of
Jones,"5 the court held that as the bill did not contain an allega-
tion that the profane swearing was repeated, the conclusion was
that it was a single act of swearing, and, therefore, not indictable.
This was in face of the allegation that the cursing took place for a
long time, to-wit, twelve seconds! The court further noted that the
bill failed to allege that anyone heard the swearing; it would ap-
pear that someone must have heard it," otherwise the bill would
not have been returned. The court went to great and tortuous
lengths to avoid considering the case on its merits. The case could
have been resolved in an easy straightforward fashion.
Following Pepper,' 7 the court held in State v. Powell,"Is that
a defect in the indictment defeated the State's case although there
was ample evidence to sustain the charge. The nub of the decision
was that profane swearing in public in and of itself was not a
crime. No reason was offered except that absent facts to sustain a
finding of a common or public nuisance, swearing was not indicta-
ble. *" Here, the court had an excellent opportunity to ground its
decision upon freedom of speech, but neither the court nor counsel
relied upon these principles.
111. Id. at 25.
112. ."[T]here being five families within the distance of a mile" of the defen-
dant. Id. at 27.
113. Id.
114. 68 N.C. 259 (1873).
115. 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 38 (1848).
116. 68 N.C. at 263.
117. 68 N.C. 259 (1873).
118. 70 N.C. 67 (1874).
119. Id. at 69.
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State v. Widenhouse120 is illustrative of a trend evident in the
era of Reconstruction toward an interpretation of the cases more
favorably to the State. The court moved away from its overly tech-
nical approach in the previous decisions in an effort to control the
black people.
In this case, defendants were convicted of forcible trespass
upon testimony that they rode up and down on the public road
before the prosecutor's house, all the while singing, dancing, curs-
ing, and swearing, and causing serious disturbance to the prosecu-
tor and his wife."' Obviously, under Wright,'2 2 the acts did not
constitute a common nuisance as only the prosecutor and his wife
were affected. The court, however, sustained the forcible trespass
conviction under the theory that although the road was public, the
prosecutor owned the land on both sides of it and, therefore, the
soil beneath the road. Persons using the road had only the privi-
lege to pass over it, and those who stopped and abused the privi-
lege became trespassers ab initio.123 Here, we find the court adopt-
ing a strained theory of property law to punish defendants for
actions clearly defensible within freedom of speech principles.
Thirty-three years after Jones, we find the court again analyz-
ing its decisions on profane swearing in State v. Chrisp."4 After
reviewing the previous cases, the court spoke on the philosophy
behind the profane and drunkenness prosecutions in these terms:
Sir W. Blackstone distinguishes between the absolute duties of
men and their relative duties as members of society, and says that
it is with respect to the latter only that municipal law assumes to
control their conduct. Let a man therefore, says he, be ever so
abandoned in his principles or vicious in his habits, he is out of
the reach of the law, provided, he keeps his wickedness to him-
self. But if he makes his views public, though they be such as
seem principally to affect himself (as drunkenness or the like)
they then become, by the bad example they set, pernicious to so-
ciety, and it is the business of the law to correct them. . .. [A]ll
open lewdness and grossly scandalous conduct is punishable by
indictment at common law, and that whatever outrages decency,
or is injurious to public morals, is a misdeameanor.'2 5
120. 71 N.C. 279 (1874).
121. Id.
122. 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 25 (1858).
123. 71 N.C. at 280.
124. 85 N.C. 528 (1881).
125. Id. at 533-34.
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Whereupon, the court held that the use of profane and vulgar lan-
guage in a public place on a single occasion amounts to a public
nuisance provided the public at large is offended and annoyed. 26
These early prosecutions were founded upon the common law,
but in State v. Cainan22 7 we find the court considering an ordi-
nance doctrine of public or common nuisance. The trend toward
the use of ordinances arose from the difficulty of proceeding under
the common law nuisance theory. The court was never faced with a
constitutional challenge to an ordinance on grounds of vagueness
or freedom of speech principles during this time. Such challenge
today would doubtless be successful.2 The people and counsel ap-
peared to accept the rationale that such ordinances were within
the authority of the governing body. The ordinance in Cainan
stated:
Every person found guilty of loud and boisterous cursing and
swearing in any street, house, or elsewhere in the city, and every
person found drunk on the streets, alleys, or any public place of
the city, disturbing the peace of the city, or violating the rules of
decency, shall be fined five dollars for every offence.12'
Whereas the prior common law actions were to punish the causing
or creating of nuisances, the acts forbidden under the ordinance
were not nuisances because they did not have to be done in the
presence or hearing of other persons. The purpose of the ordinance
was to promote good morals, the decencies and proprieties of soci-
ety, and to prevent nuisances and other criminal acts. Under the
ordinance, boisterous cursing and swearing, no matter what were
the precise words used, constituted the offense.
The use of town ordinances to control speech and conduct
spread rapidly. State v. Debnam80 involved a "boisterous cursing"
ordinance. Defendant, a "colored man," and two women had
blocked a sidewalk so that a local white doctor could not pass
without touching one of them. In passing, the doctor's arm gently
brushed the arm of one of the women. Defendant began to abuse
him in an angry manner, loud enough to attract the attention of
126. Id. at 534.
127. 94 N.C. 879 (1886).
128. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 287 N.C. 392, 215 S.E.2d 111 (1975); State v.
Frinks, 284 N.C. 472, 201 S.E.2d 858 (1974); State v. Summrell, 282 N.C. 157, 192
S.E.2d 569 (1972); State v. Smedberg, 31 N.C. App. 585, 229 S.E.2d 841 (1976).
129. 94 N.C. at 880.
130. 98 N.C. 712, 3 S.E. 742 (1887).
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people nearby. The doctor did not stop, but walked slowly on. He
did not hear defendant curse or swear. Another witness testified he
heard defendant say had the woman been his wife, "he would
knock the God damned old scoundrel's head off."13 1 Defendant de-
nied he cursed or talked loudly. The opinion makes note that all of
defendant's witnesses were "colored." The court also referred to
Dr. Anderson as a "cultivated, refined and spirited witness."' 32
Based upon Cainan,33 the court upheld the ordinance and af-
firmed the conviction of defendant.'" Neither the court nor coun-
sel made reference to freedom of speech issues, and the case ap-
pears to have had racial overtones.
The defendant in State v. Warren'" pled guilty to violating
an ordinance making it unlawful to use profane language to the
disturbance of the peace on the lands of the Henrietta Cotton
Mills in Rutherford County. The question on appeal was whether
the facts charged, and admitted by defendant through his plea,
constituted an offense punishable under the laws and constitution.
The constitutionality of the ordinance was questioned upon two
grounds, one being that it was an interference with the freedom of
speech. In addressing this issue, the court merely stated:
The Legislature could have empowered a municipality to make
the use of such language punishable by its ordinances, when it
falls short of being a nuisance, punishable by State law, from not
having been "committed in the presence and hearing of divers
persons, to their annoyance," etc. S. v. Cainan, 94 N.C., 880; S. v.
Debnam, 98 N.C., 712. Of course the Legislature could do this
directly, if it could do it indirectly, as by authorizing a municipal-
ity to make an ordinance to that effect."'
This is the first opinion in which the words "freedom of
speech" are found. Although counsel for the defendant raised the
issue and convinced the trial judge that the ordinance was uncon-
stitutional, the Supreme Court reversed. 3 7 The Court, through
Justice Clark, did not analyze the freedom of speech question at
all, but merely stated that the municipality had been properly del-
131. Id. at 714.
132. Id. at 716.
133. 94 N.C. 879 (1886).
134. 98 N.C. 712, 717, 3 S.E. 742, 742 (1887).
135. 113 N.C. 683, 18 S.E. 498 (1893).
136. Id. at 685, 18 S.E. at 498-99.
137. Id. at 686, 18 S.E. at 499.
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egated the authority to adopt the ordinance."' It is noted that the
ordinance was for the purpose of protecting the Henrietta Cotton
Mills, one of the larger industries in Rutherford County, lending
credence to the theory that property interests, especially those af-
fecting the state's economy, were paramount to personal rights.
Although not decided on first amendment grounds, the first
case holding an anti-swearing ordinance unconstitutional insofar as
this research has disclosed was State v. Horne."9 The ordinance
read in part: "No person shall use obscene or profane language in
the town.""" In addressing the issue, the court held that the lack
of a requirement that the conduct be "loud or boisterous" or that
it "disturb the peace" rendered the ordinance invalid. The court
further held that the town did not have power to enact an ordi-
nance to the "extraordinary extent."1 4'
In Home," we find Justice Clark, one year after Warren,"'
again writing for the Court, this time striking down an ordinance.
Although the ordinance obviously violated first amendment princi-
ples, Justice Clark did not raise the issue in the opinion. Neverthe-
less, the decision appears to have been responsive to underlying
policy concerns that today would be considered first amendment
issues. At best, the reasoning of the Court was suggestive of a hold-
ing that the ordinance was overly broad, even though not explicitly
stated as such. It must be noted that no property or economic
rights were at issue. It can be fairly assumed that this affected the
result.
During this period we find disorderly conduct ordinances re-
placing "profane swearing" ordinances in the control of speech and
behavior. Evidently this was for the purpose of broadening the net
to include actions as well as speech in controlling the behavior of
the populace. To illustrate, the case of State v. Sherrard'" in-
volved a defendant convicted of violating a town ordinance pro-
scribing "all disorderly conduct. . . within the city limits."' 45 The
State's evidence showed that defendant entered the restaurant of
Agnes Cox, and called the prosecuting witness "a damned highway
138. Id. at 685, 18 S.E. at 499.
139. 115 N.C. 739, 20 S.E. 443 (1894).
140. Id. at 740, 20 S.E. at 443.
141. Id. at 741, 20 S.E. at 443.
142. 115 N.C. 739, 20 S.E. 443 (1894).
143. 113 N.C. 683, 18 S.E. 498 (1893).
144. 117 N.C. 717, 23 S.E. 157 (1895).
145. Id. at 718, 23 S.E. at 157.
266 [Vol. 4:243
24
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss2/1
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
robber" 146 in a loud manner that could be heard on the street.
Upon a verdict of guilty, the court fined the defendant a penny
and he appealed. 147 The appellate court upheld the validity of the
ordinance even though the conduct did not amount to an indicta-
ble nuisance or other criminal offense. Disorderly conduct per se
was not forbidden by general state law.148 The court relied upon
Cainan149 and Debnam.60 Because the conduct was not so re-
peated and public as to be a nuisance to the public, the state law
was not applicable. The court reasoned, however, that failure to
punish the conduct by the city ordinance would result in permit-
ting loud, boisterous and unseemly language and threats of vio-
lence, to the serious annoyance of the public passing along the
streets.151 A close reading of the records does not disclose any
threat of violence, and Justice Clark again fails to discuss any free-
dom of speech issues.
In State v. Moore, 5 ' defendant was convicted of cursing on
the streets in a loud and disorderly manner. As she stepped into
her buggy, she told a policeman who had cautioned her about driv-
ing, that she would drive "where she damned please[d]."1 583 No one
other than the policeman heard the statement.'" The court de-
clined to enter upon a casuistical discussion of whether "damn"
was profanity and decided the case upon the theory that defen-
dant's conduct was not disorderly within the meaning of the ordi-
nance. The conduct did not tend to disturb the peace or good or-
der of the town and had no vicious or injurious tendency. "The
defendant expressed her displeasure, or futile indignation, a little
too strongly, and should not have used so indecorous an expletive
in doing so, but it did not reach beyond the ears of the policeman,
and hardly made a ripple on the placid surface of municipal
peace."1 55 No reference was made to defendant's freedom of speech
rights.
Research disclosed that most of the cases involving potential
146. Id. at 720, 23 S.E. at 158.
147. Id. at 718, 23 S.E. at 157.
148. Id. at 718-19, 23 S.E. at 157.
149. 94 N.C. 879 (1886).
150. 98 N.C. 712, 3 S.E. 742 (1887).
151. 117 N.C. at 720, 23 S.E. at 158.
152. 166 N.C. 371, 81 S.E. 693 (1914).
153. Id. at 371, 81 S.E. at 694.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 373, 81 S.E. at 694.
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first amendment issues were criminal, but an interesting civil ac-
tion involving freedom of speech arose in Seawell v. Carolina Cen-
tral Railroad Co.'" The case involved a suit in negligence against
the railroad for failing to protect plaintiff, a ticketed passenger
waiting at the station for his train. While there, he was assaulted
by a mob throwing eggs at him. Plaintiff was the Republican party
candidate for Lieutenant-Governor of North Carolina and had spo-
ken that day in Cleveland County, a Democratic stronghold.' 58 In
his opinion, Clark, then Chief Justice, said:
The Constitution and laws of this State guarantee freedom of
speech, and nothing could be more unmanly than a mob assailing
one man in such manner for his difference from them in his polit-
ical opinion. No right thinking man, here or elsewhere, will ex-
press other opinion of the proceeding, and the most that can be
said is that it was the act of a mob, for which the community was
not responsible.'"
This was the extent of the Court's discussion of freedom of speech.
Of course, as discussed earlier, the Chief Justice was in error in
stating that North Carolina had a constitutional guaranty of free-
dom of speech at the time. Likewise, this research has failed to
disclose any statutory law guaranteeing such freedom. As shown by
previous analysis, however, the common law of North Carolina at
the time included freedom of speech protection and perhaps Jus-
tice Clark based his statement upon this theory. Or, as noted ear-
lier, '8 the right of freedom of speech may have been so common
and ingrained in the life of the people and in the thinking of the
judges, that none felt any need or reason for an analysis of the
principles or even a statement of the principle. There is no need to
state the obvious.
(3) Disturbing Religious Services. Several cases are found in
which the right to freedom of religion should have been tested by
conflicting freedom of speech principles. Although the court dis-
cusses freedom of religion, which has always been guaranteed by
the North Carolina Constitution, the doctrine of freedom of speech
was not mentioned, discussed or acknowledged. Representative of
these decisions are State v. Jasper,6 0 State v. Linkhaw,1'6 and
156. 133 N.C. 515, 45 S.E. 850 (1903).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 516, 45 S.E. 851.
159. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
160. 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 323 (1833).
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State v. Ramsay.' 2
In Jasper,163 the defendant was charged with disturbing a con-
gregation, assembled for religious worship, by laughing, talking,
and making indecent actions and grimaces. Defendant's conviction
was affirmed on appeal.'" The court recognized the freedom of all
persons to worship according to their own consciences, noting that
the North Carolina Constitution guaranteed this preexisting
right.'" It held that the constitutional guarantee included security
from molestation in the act of worship. The state had no statute
prohibiting the disturbance of religious assemblies, but the court
found that the common law of the state proscribed such conduct,
holding that it constituted an injury to the whole community.'"
This is analogous to the reasoning in the common law nuisance
cases which required that the action complained of be to the an-
noyance of the community.
. In Linkhaw, 7 defendant was charged with disturbing a reli-
gious congregation by the manner in which he sang the hymns. His
voice was heard after all the other singers had ceased.'" The court
upheld defendant's rights to sing even though it did disturb the
congregation, reasoning that the singing of hymns was a part of
worship service and protected under the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of religion.'" g
The court in Ramsay'7 0 considered a case in which defendant
was charged with speaking out in church concerning his expulsion
from the congregation two weeks previously.'71 The evidence was
in conflict as to whether the services had actually commenced. De-
fendant was removed from the church house but returned, and in
the confusion the meeting was broken up and those present left
the church and returned home. The court held that even if the jury
found defendant was still a member of the congregation, his con-
duct was subject to criminal penalties as he was not participating
161. 69 N.C. 214 (1873).
162. 78 N.C. 448 (1878). See also supra note 55.
163. 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 323, 324 (1833).
164. Id. at 323.
165. Id. at 324.
166. Id. at 326.
167. 60 N.C. (Win.) 214 (1873).
168. Id. at 214-15.
169. Id. at 217.
170. 78 N.C. 448 (1878).
171. Id. at 449.
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in the worship service as in Linkhaw, but attempting to speak
upon an issue foreign to the service. The court further held that it
was immaterial whether the services had actually begun.7 2
(4) Ribald singing. An interesting application of the law of
common law nuisance appears in a case involving a female singing
a ribald song on the public streets of Charlotte, North Carolina.
Defendant Laura Toole1" was charged with singing an obscene
song for a period of ten minutes. Not all of the song was vulgar or
obscene, but the court held that the use of vulgar stanza as a part
of a longer song extending for ten minutes on a public street would
be a nuisance, even though the vulgar stanza was not repeated.
The singing of the song in the manner charged and in the hearing
of diverse persons is what constituted the common nuisance. 17 4
The court relied upon Chrisp.'75 Although there were two dissent-
ing opinions as to procedural problems in the case, none of the
three opinions recognized any defense Laura Toole may have had
by virtue of her rights to freedom of speech. The court made no
analysis of what constituted obscenity or vulgarity. The offending
language is not set out in the opinion (the court saw no reason to
stain the pages of its reports) and we have no way of measuring the
correctness of the court's characterization of the song.
b. Conduct
(1) Drunkenness. In the succeeding cases we find the court ap-
plying the principles of common law nuisance to public drunken-
ness. The approach is similar to that used in the profane swearing
cases. In State v. Waller,17 6 defendant was charged with the fol-
lowing indictment:
that Henry Waller, late of the County of Edgecombe, yeoman, on
1 January, 1817, and on divers other days and times, as well
before as afterwards, was, and yet is, a common, gross, and noto-
rious drunkard, and that he, on the said first day of January, in
the year aforesaid, and on divers other days and times, in the
County aforesaid, did then and there get grossly drunk and com-
mit open and notorious drunkenness, contrary to morality, to the
great displeasure of Almighty God, and to the evil example of all
172. Id. at 453.
173. State v. Toole, 106 N.C. 736, 11 S.E. 168 (1890).
174. Id. at 738, 11 S.E. at 169.
175. 85 N.C. 528 (1881).
176. 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) 229 (1819).
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others in like cases offending and against the peace and dignity of
the State.1 77
The court, without reference to first amendment principles, held
that private drunkenness was no offense under the law. To be
criminal, it must be so open and exposed to public view as to be a
public nuisance.
17 8
In State v. Deberry,17 9 the court solidified the rule requiring a
showing that defendant's conduct must operate to the annoyance,
detriment or disturbance of the public at large before defendant
may be found criminally liable for an act of drunkenness.8 ' The
court stated that there are many immoral acts best left to correc-
tion by the religious and moral influence of society.181 The court
here recognized that certain conduct, although perhaps inappropri-
ate, is not controlled by state action.182 In so doing, however, the
court did not rely upon first amendment concepts to sustain that
conclusion.
c. Assembly
(1) Dancing and Merrymaking. In cases involving slaves, the
court appears to adopt more stringent rules. Although lenient in
the treatment of slaves while on their master's property, stern ef-
forts were otherwise made to control blacks. Two cases illustrate
this conclusion.
The court in State v. Boyce1 8 upheld the right of a master to
allow his slaves to meet and dance on his premises on Christmas
Eve and other holidays, even though other slaves and some white
persons joined in the merrymaking. In determining that defendant
was not guilty of maintaining a disorderly house, the court relied
upon the customs of the area in treating slaves and on the fact that
defendant's home was located some distance from a public road
and half a mile from any other house.18 4 The court, without calling
it freedom of speech, appeared to allow greater leeway for slaves in
assembling, singing and dancing than in the ordinary public nui-
177. Id. at 229-30.
178. Id. at 230.
179. 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 371 (1845).
180. Id. at 373.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 536 (1849).
184. Id. at 540.
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sance case.
When the law tolerates such merrymakings among these people,
it must be expected, in the nature of things, that they will not
enter into them with the quiet and composure which distinguish
the gaieties of a refined society. . .. One cannot well regard with
severity the rude pranks of a laboring race, relaxing itself in
frolic, though they may seem to some to be at times somewhat
excessive .... We may let them make the most of their idle
hours, and may well make allowances for the noisy outpourings of
glad hearts ... .8"
Within the confines of their chains, slaves were granted greater
freedom of speech rights than free men!
(2) Disorderly Shouting by Slaves. In contrast to Boyce, Town
of Washington v. Frank and John" stands for the proposition
that once slaves were off the property of their master, harsh rules
were applied restricting their attempted exercise of free speech.
The Town of Washington charged defendants Frank and John
with violating an ordinance forbidding all disorderly shouting and
dancing and disorderly assemblies by slaves on the streets, in the
market and in other public places in the town. Punishment was
not more than thirty-nine lashes. The evidence showed that several
slaves, including defendants, were on the public street near the of-
fice of the Intendant of Police making a loud noise by laughing and
talking. There was no quarreling or fighting, only laughing and
talking. The Intendant ordered them to disperse, which they
promptly did, only to reassemble a short time later to engage in
the same loud talking and laughing.187
The court found the ordinance lawful and constitutional. Con-
ceding that the rights, if any, of slaves to freedom of speech are
doubtful, the court implied that the ordinance also applied by its
terms to white persons. The court made no reference to any de-
fects in the ordinance by reason of freedom of speech. To the con-
trary, the court held defendants were guilty even though the noise
was made in play."" Perhaps a true insight into the court's deci-
sion is found in the statement that slaves "compose so large a por-
tion of the population.. . that, in passing rules... for their gov-
ernment, much must be left to the judgment and discretion of
185. Id. at 541.
186. 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 436 (1854).
187. Id. at 438.
188. Id. at 440.
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those who are to enforce them."' ' Although the court had an op-
portunity to dispose of the case in favor of defendants because of a
defect in the indictment (a device we have seen the court often
use), it chose to allow the bill to be amended.'"
(3) Peaceable Assembly. In 1875, we find the court taking a
less restrictive approach to the conduct of persons charged with
creating a public nuisance and obstructing the streets. In State v.
Hughes, 91 the court was faced with group action rather than one
person charged with acts constituting a nuisance, although pre-
sumably the same law would have been applicable whether one or
more persons were involved. This case arose shortly after the close
of the Civil War and the termination of martial law. It involved the
celebration of an important event from the war years, held in high
esteem by the federal government. 9 The defendants were charged
with rioting, committing a common nuisance, and obstructing the
streets. They had assembled in town to celebrate the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation and had paraded through the streets, some on
horseback, with drums and fifes for two or three hours. They dis-
mounted upon request, but refused to disperse, going instead to
the mayor's house, with drums beating, to make up a case to test
the right of the mayor to forbid the procession. No violence in any
form was exhibited.""
The court held for defendants, finding that the assembly was
lawful and, therefore, could not be a riot. The beating of the drums
and blowing of the fifes did not create a common nuisance. Only a
few persons (and one horse that "broke loose") were disturbed, not
the community as a whole. The acts by defendants were not a nui-
sance. While it was true that at times some of the streets were
obstructed, it was only such obstruction as was usually incident to
such assemblies and, therefore, was not criminal.'" In good first
amendment argument, the court concluded its opinion with:
In a popular government like ours, the laws allow great lati-
tude to public demonstrations, whether political, social or moral,
and it requires but little reflection to foresee, that if such acts as
are here found by the jury, are to be construed to be indictable,
189. Id. at 440-41.
190. Id. at 441.
191. 72 N.C. 25 (1875).
192. Id. at 26.
193. Id. at 27.
194. Id. at 28.
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that the doctrine of riots and common nuisances, would be ex-
tended far beyond the limits heretofore circumscribing them, and
would put an end to all public celebrations, however innocent or
commendable the purpose.1"
A similar question arose in State v. Hunter,'" a case which
involved a charge of violating an ordinance prohibiting assembling
and loitering on the streets in sufficient numbers or in such man-
ner as to cause an obstruction to free passage on the streets or
sidewalks. The evidence showed that four or five men were on the
sidewalks, and when requested to disperse, all left except one. The
officer arrested the defendant after he refused to move on.1'  The
court held that one man cannot be guilty of a nuisance by merely
standing still on the sidewalk and refusing to move at the com-
mand of an officer. Any obstruction present was removed when the
others dispersed. The court further recognized that city ordinances
were subject to the state and federal constitutions, and that the
ordinance was void because it purported to give the officer power
to arrest a person and take him to prison without warrant, prelimi-
nary hearing, or opportunity for bail.1"9 In contrast to its other de-
cisions, the court here applied the United States Constitution to
the ordinance, 1" long before the United States Supreme Court
took this step.
d. Freedom of the Press
As we have seen, the courts seldom recognized freedom of
speech issues and never overturned a conviction based upon those
concepts. By way of contrast, we find the court in the following
cases acknowledging freedom of the press and applying it as a de-
fense, most commonly in proceedings for contempt. The court
freely discussed the principles involved. It may be fairly argued
that the court's application of the freedom of press doctrine was
based upon the clause of the Declaration of Rights guaranteeing
this freedom.
In Biggs, Ex Parte,2" respondent was both a practicing lawyer
and the editor of a newspaper. He published an editorial which
195. Id.
196. 106 N.C. 796, 11 S.E. 366 (1890).
197. Id. at 797, 11 S.E. at 367.
198. Id. at 800, 11 S.E. at 368.
199. Id.
200. 64 N.C. 202 (1870).
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could be interpreted as being derogatory of a trial judge. Upon the
issuance of an order for contempt, Biggs filed an answer disavow-
ing any intent of committing a contempt of the court and stating
that the publication was in his capacity as an editor, not as an
attorney, and furthermore, that any comment upon the publicly
elected judge was allowed by the freedom of the press as defined in
the United States Constitution. Counsel on both sides briefed and
argued the issues of freedom of the press, but the court neatly
sidestepped these issues by holding that the disavowal filed by
Biggs was binding upon the court and entitled him to his dis-
charge; there was no mode of trying the truth or sincerity of the
disavowal; it was left to the "Searcher of all hearts."201
Another example of the use of freedom of the press in the de-
fense of contempt proceedings is In re Robinson.20 Robinson was
charged with contempt of court resulting from publication of a
news article criticizing the judge in ordering removal of a criminal
cause to another county for trial. Robinson relied upon truth as a
defense and that freedom of the press provisions in the state and
federal constitutions protected the publication. After some discus-
sion of freedom of the press, the court cited Biggs 03 and held the
proceeding was barred by the disavowal of intent by respondent,
and discharged the order to show cause.2"
Cowan v. Fairbrother20 5 involved the use of freedom of the
press arguments to attack an injunction forbidding defendants
from participating in the publication of a newspaper within the
state of North Carolina. The injunction was based upon a non-
competing covenant in a contract whereby plaintiff bought a news-
paper from defendants. They contended that the non-competing
clause was invalid as being contrary to their rights of freedom of
the press. The court affirmed the issuance of the injunction:
When the framers of our Constitution declared that the freedom
of the press was one of the bulwarks of liberty, and therefore
ought never to be restrained, but that every individual should be
held responsible for the abuse of the same, they entertained no
purpose to restrict the power of any person to dispose of anything
of value, which, as the creature of his own mental or physical ex-
201. Id. at 218.
202. 117 N.C. 533, 23 S.E. 453 (1895).
203. Id. at 540, 23 S.E. at 455.
204. Id.
205. 118 N.C. 406, 24 S.E. 212 (1896).
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ertions, had become his property. The right is as much a funda-
mental one as is that to use the press without violation of reason-
able laws intended to protect others from libel and slander. In its
broadest sense, freedom of the press includes not only exemption
from censorship, but security against laws enacted by the legisla-
tive department of the Government or measures resorted to by
either of the other branches for the purpose of stifling just criti-
cism or muzzling public opinion. . .. It has never been held any-
where that these provisions could be made engines of oppression
by construing them as restrictions upon the right to sell anything
of value that is the creature of one's brain, provided society would
not be made to suffer by the transaction.2"
A case representing an example of censorship of the press with
the court's approval is State v. Worth.207 The court here continued
to hold contract and property rights paramount to personal indi-
vidual freedoms. Worth was charged with publishing and circulat-
ing a book entitled The Impending Crisis of the South, by Hinton
Rowan Helper. The book condemned slavery in inflamatory lan-
guage and advocated the abolition of slavery by any manner, in-
cluding force if necessary. The court upheld the statute relied
upon, which prevented circulations of written or printed matter
designed to cause discontent among slaves or dissatisfaction among
free negroes.108 The court made no reference to freedom of the
press; however, the case must be considered in its historical set-
ting. It was decided at the June, 1860 Term immediately prior to
the commencement of the Civil War. When viewed in that context,
it is not surprising that the court withheld freedom of the press
defenses from its opinion. It is remarkable that attorneys
Morehead and Gorrell, able counsel of their day, did not raise
these issues in their defense of Worth.
V. CONCLUSION
The "rights" contained in the Declaration of Rights were basi-
cally safeguards against oppressive governmental action and not
declarations of individual rights. The wording of some of the arti-
cles, however, is cast in language which could support a contrary
conclusion. We find, for example, that "the people have a right to
assemble together." Yet the courts made little or no reference to
206. Id. at 417, 418, 24 S.E. at 215.
207. 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 488 (1860).
208. Id. at 490.
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the Declaration in deciding "assembly" cases that logically called
for an interpretation of the Declaration. Instead, the courts usually
contented themselves with terse statements that a city or town had
authority to adopt the regulation in question. The inquiry was di-
rected toward whether there had been oppressive governmental ac-
tion, rather than toward an examination of whether the rights of
an individual had been violated. Bearing in mind the historical
reason why the Declaration became a part of the constitution, the
reasoning is more understandable and acceptable. The impetus for
its adoption was a fear of government, engendered by the over-
reaching actions of the British Crown, not the need to establish
and protect individual liberties. While one may seem to be the op-
posite side of the coin to the other, the important result was that
the analysis of the cases proceeded from the point of view of
whether the government had acted in excess of its authority and
not in an analysis of the constitutional rights of individuals.
The development of the "cotton" economy demanded, above
all, the sanctity of property rights both as to land and personal
property (slaves). Whenever this collided with individual rights in
the court, the interest of the economy usually prevailed. After Re-
construction, the economic interest continued to prevail, with the
emphasis shifting from property rights and control of slaves to
contracts, transportation and the change of the economy from agri-
cultural to industrial. Rolled into this process was the intense
problem of the white race maintaining control of government and,
thereby, the economy. In the midst of this proliferation of com-
peting interests, it is perhaps not surprising that individual rights
had to await the twentieth century for their full recognition and
development.2 09
209. In this developmental process, perhaps the most significant event was
the passage of N.C. GEN STAT. § 116-199, the so-called "speaker ban law," in 1963
(amended 1965). This act, passed in the heat of student unrest throughout the
state, prohibited the use of the facilities of any state-supported college or univer-
sity for speaking purposes by any person who: (1) is a known member of the Com-
munist Party; (2) is known to advocate the overthrow of the Constitution of the
United States or of the state of North Carolina; (3) has pleaded the fifth amend-
ment in refusing to answer questions with respect to Communist or subversive
activities. Of course, the passage of the statute immediately attracted many per-
sons eager to test its validity. This led to the decision in Dickson v. Sitterson, 280
F. Supp. 487 (M.D.N.C. 1968), by a three-judge panel. The court held the statute
unconstitutional because of vagueness. Although the legislature did not repeal the
act, it did adopt a proposed new constitution in 1969, to be effective 1 July 1971
upon ratification by vote of the people. It was so ratified, including for the first
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time a guaranty of freedom of speech. The legislative commentary on the 1971
constitution is sparse, but it can be inferred from the close nexus in time, that the
speaker ban law and decision spurred, if not spawned, the inclusion of the free-
dom of speech provision in the 1971 constitution.
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